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Case No, ___ ntt, No.."""""""""'"'··"'""".,.,,,...,,_· 
Flied ~.M.--====-?iM 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DfSTRJCT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RHONDA TRUSDALL, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR-2011-1684-C 
(Supreme Court No. 40241-2012) 
--------~----) 
ORDER GRANTING 
STIPULATION FOR 
ADDmONS TO THE 
CLERK'S RECORD ON 
APPEAL 
The Court having considered the parties Stipulation for Additions to the Clerk's Record 
on Appeal, and there being good cause, it is hereby ordered that said stipulation is GRANTED. 
The following documents shall be added to the Clerk's Record pursuant to 1.A.R. 29: 
1) Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (filed 81211 l); 
2) Affidavit for ALS Decision and Vehicle Registration and Titling Information 
(filed 9/15/1 l); 
3) Memorandum Decision Denying Motion to Dismiss (filed 10/27/11 ); 
4) Memorandum Regarding Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration (filed 
11123/11 ); 
5) Opening Brief of Appellant (filed 5/14/12); 
6) Brief of Respondent (filed 615112); and 
1 • ORDER GRANTING STIPULATION FOR ADDITIONS TO CLERK'S RECORD ON 
APPEAL 
Sep 26 2012 10:53AM Nevin 8enjamin,McifJ8art 208 345 8274 
7) Reply Brief of Appellant (filed 6/11112). 
a~ 
DATED this l~day ot:S i 7 , 2012. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
District Judge 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that onScptenrber .z..q , 2012, 1 caused a true and correct copies 
of the foregoing to be mailed to: 
Jeffrey Brownson 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
Lori Fleming 
Deputy Attorney General 
Criminal Division 
P .0. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0010 
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SEP 2 6 2012 
CaseNo. __ _.nst.No,._ __ 
Jeffrey BroM1S0n Filed 4' "7 ___ A.M. · '--= P.~ 
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTIETI LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
303 West Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343-1000 
Attorneys for the Defendant/Respondent 
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT FOR TIIE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff7 Appellant, 
Case No. CR-2011-1684-C 
(Supreme Coun No. 40241-2012) 
vs. 
RHONDA TRUSDALL, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
STIPULATION FOR ADDITIONS TO 
THE CLERK'S RECORD ON 
"'APPEAL 
DefendanVRespondcnt. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~> 
Defendant/Respondent, Rhonda Trusdall, through her attorney Jeffrey Brownson and 
PlaintiffiAppellant, the State of Idaho, through its attorney Lori Fleming. stipulate and agree that 
the following documents should be added to the Cle:rlc's Record pursuattt to I.A.R. 29: 
1) Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss (filed 812/11 )~ 
2) Affidavit for ALS Decision and Vehicle Registration and 1rtling Information 
(filed 9115/11); 
3) Mcmcnmdum Decision Denying Mot.ion to Dismiss (fiJed 10/27/11); 
4) Memorandum Regarding Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration (filed 
11123111); 
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Sep 26 2012 10:53AM Nevin Benjamin,Mc~art 208 345 8274 
5) Opening Brief of Appellant (filed S/14112); 
6) Brief of Respondent (filed 615/12); and 
7) Reply Brief of Appellant (filed 6/11/12). 
Good cause ~ists because these pleadings and documents are necessary for the Court to 
review in determining the issue on appeal in this matter. 
DATED this M_ day of September. 2012. 
, BENJAMJN, McKAY & BARTLETI UP 
siciwru:on 
ey for Defendant/Respondent 
DATED this .Lc/tyofSeptember, 2012. 
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of the Magistrate Court's ruling denying the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
and for Reconsideration of Dismissal on the legal theory that the State may not charge a DUI under 
Idaho Code Title 18 where a recreational DUI under ldaho Code § 67-7114 may be charged because the 
Defendant was operating a Utility Type Vehicle ("UTV"). 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The facts in this case were not developed in great detail due to the nature of the defense and 
prosecution of the case. By all accounts, it was an event fraught with risk; an operator of a non-safoty 
regulated passenger vehicle; a high performance 2006 Polaris Ranger UTV; 6 boy passengers, ages 7 -
13, without safety restraints and none wearing required safoty helmets; and the UTV spinning 
"cookies" in the gravel parking lot of a church in such a manner that vision was totally obstructed by 
dust to the nearby investigating officer, who moved back for his own safety. The vehicle had traveled 
from the State Park at Cascade Lake to the Church located adjacent to Highway 55 just north of 
Cascade on the West side of the highway. There \vas an open i::ontainer in the dashboard cup holder and 
Ms. Trusdall blew a Br AC of.169/.164 after failing the SFSTs. The State agreed with the Defendant and 
her counsel that Church's original restitution claim for damage to the parking lot in the amount of 
$1.000 appeared to be substantially over-stated and even the documented substantially reduced estimate 
repair amount could have been subject to reasonable challenge at hearing. 
To the credit of Ms. Trusdall, age 42, this was a first offense and not characteristic of her 
demonstrated public history and performance. She had addressed her actions and her defense counsel 
had approached the State with a balanced approach of responsibility, lenity and the assertion that in 
good faith and sound legal rea.<:oning based on intervening developments, that the in pari materia 
doctrine adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378 (1999) should be 
disregarded in this case and that the State should be required to prosecute the DUI portion (and all 
counts relying or predicated on Title 18 DUI offenses, specifically including the injury to child 
cbarge(s)) on Idaho Code§ 67-7114 or other legal theories. 
(n retrospect, a little more time, patience or discussion may have resulted in a more professional 
and less charged response from the State to what the State's Counsel felt was a very generous plea 
offer, but the Defendant had already briefed the issue in her ALS proceedings and wanted to proceed 
without a guilty plea to the DUL This counsel faults his lack of quality communication in part, if not in 
the majority. for this difficulty. If this Counsel had listened or understood better, the record likely 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, P. S 
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would be less voluminous. TI1e State consequently did focus on the necessary amended and 
comprehensive alternative charges in the event the Defendant prevailed on her motion. 
The Stute submitted proof of the ALS decision and analysis on the same issue and additional 
proof of the Defendant's licensure, titling and registration of the UTV via the exhibits to Counsel's 
affidavit dated September 15, 2011. 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The State agrees with the Defendant-Appellant, that this Honorable Court exercises free review 
on this issue of law of case and statutory interpretation for the standard of review on appeal from the 
order denying the Defendant-Appellant's Motion to Uismiss. As stated by the Idaho Supreme Court in 
State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 379, 859 P.2d 290 (1999): " the construction and interpretation of a statute 
present questions of law over which this Court exercises free review. See State v. Hagerman Water 
Right Owners, 130 Idaho 727, 732, 947 P.2d 400, 405 (1997); Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial Hosp .. 
130 Idaho 420, 422, 942 P.2d 544, 546 ( 1997). Statutes relating to the same subject matter, although in 
apparent conflict, are to be construed in harmony, if reasonably possible. See Cox v. Mueller, 125 Idaho 
734, 736, 874 P.2d 545, 547 (1994); State v. Maland, 124 ldaho 537, 540, 861P.2d107, 110 
(Ct.App.1993)." Id. at 133 Idaho 380. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, P. 6 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
A The Supreme Court's Holding In Bames That Recreational Motor Vehicles Are 
"Motor Vehicles" For The Purposes Of 18-8004 ls The State Of The Law 
In Barnes, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court considered and analyzed the same general argument 
made by the Defendant-Appellant in this case. Barnes had been arrested for DUJ pursuant to I.C. § J 8· 
8004 after refusing to accept a ride from an officer who had responded to a report of fighting near the 
Island Park Lodge. The Lodge owner had requested that the officer drive Barnes home because she was 
in no condition to drive. Instead, Barnes refused and drove off <lown Big Springs Road, a road plowed 
and maintained by freemont County, on her sno'Wlllobile. Barnes stopped and was questioned by the 
officer again. She was disoriented. The Ofticer advised that she was at her intended destination and 
asked to take her vehicle keys. Barnes got back on her machine and drove oIT again and then back to 
the Lodge where she was arrested for DUI. 
Barnes made the same 2-prong defense/attack argument that Defendant-Appellant makes in this 
case: (1) that a snowmobile (UTV) shouJd not be considered a "motor vehicle" for purposes of applying 
J.C. § 18-8004 because sno\Vmobiles (UTVs) axe treated differently than motor vehicles in several 
ways. The Court's analysis, included a review of Idaho Code§ 49-l 23(2)(g) which Barnes had raised 
and which the Defendant-Appellant raises herein; and (2) that because there is a specific statute 
addressing the offense of an intoxicated sno\.\<mobile (UTV) operator, 1.C. § 67-7110 (l.C. § 67-7114 
for UTV), she was improperly charged under the D.U.I. statute, I.C. § 18-8400. 
Defendant-Appellant asserts that the cases are distinguishable because of two subsequent 
statutory changes: the first being the change to LC. § 49-l23(2)(g) in 2008 which incorporated the 
"federal motor vehicle safety standards" (F!'YfVSS) as prescribed by the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (NHTSA); and secondly, the Idaho Legislature created a new statute LC. § 67-
7114 providing for a misdemeanor status for UTV intoxification status (the Barnes Court, however, 
already noted this second change in its decision. 1 Clearly, the Idaho Supreme Court has already 
I. It should be noted that the 1999 Idaho Legjslature amended Chapler 71, Title 67 of the Idaho Code to 
provide that the operation of a snowmobile or all terrain vehicle under the influence of alcohol, drugs 
or other intoxicating substance on a public roadway or highway shall be a misdemeanor. 1999 Idaho 
Sess. Laws Ch. 3 59 (House Bill 55, effective July l, 1999). However, this enactment does not affect the 
outcome of the present case. This Court recently held that when the legislature enacts an amendment to 
an existing statute, it has done so to clarify, strengthen or make a change to an existing statute. See 
Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 13 l Idaho 731, 735, 963 P.2d J 168, 1172 (1998). It is clear that by 
amending Chapter 71, Title 67 of the Idaho Code, the legislature intended to simply clarify and 
strengthen this chapter so that there would be no mistake that the operation of a snovv111obile on a 
RESPONDENT'S BR1EF, P. 7 
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addressed and decided this second issue with regard to the alleged conflicting and competing 
misdemeanor alternatives and has found there is no conflict under the doctrim: of in pari material. Id 
at 133 ldaho 382. 
With regard to the first premise, and Defendant·Appellant's argument is that the Legislature 
intended to exclude UTV vehicles as a category for Title 18 Dl'I prosecutions due to the 2008 
amendment of I. C. § 49- J 23(2)(g), based upon the plain and unambiguous language of the statute. 
However, the stated purpose for the legislation provides a contrary intention related to vehicle titling 
and registration purposes rather than DCI enforcement or exclusion of UTV s from LC. § 18.80()4 DUI 
prosecutions: 
Statement of Purpose / Fiscal Impact 
REPRINT REPRINT REPRfNT REPRINT 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS l 7359Cl 
This legislation will incorporate the "federal motor vehicle 
safety standards" (FMVSS) as prescribed by the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) into Idaho1s vehicle 
registration code, clearly defining motor vehicles for the purpose 
of registration and titling, and which vehicles are allowed to be 
operated on public roads. Manufacturers who produce vt!hicles made 
for use in the United States are required by federal law to 
certify to NHTSA, that their vehicles comply with the FMVSS. 
More frequently, vehicles are created or imported from other 
countries that were not manufactured to comply wit<sic> federal safety 
standards to be operated on public roads in the U.S. Typically 
they were not built with the intent to import them to the U.S. The 
authority is needed in Idaho code to prohibit the registration and 
use of public roads for these types of vehicles. 
FISCAL NOTE 
No fiscal impact. 
public roadway or highway while intoxicated results in the same legal consequences as the operation of 
anv other motor vehicle while intoxicated, i.e., a misdemeanor. Thus, the fact that the legislature has 
cl~fied the snowmobHe statute does not mean that Barnes was improperly charged wider I.C. § 18-
8004.'. Barnes, supra, 133 Idaho at 384. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, P. 8 
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http://legislature.idaho.gov!legislation/2008/H0365.htmL#son (format, but not content, edited for 
presentation, except for <sic> above). 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Barnes never ruled that that the use of"motor vehicle" in Idaho 
Code§ 18-8004 was specifically governed or limited by any definition in title 49. Clearly the changes 
to J.C. § 49-l 23(2)(g) were not made to address DUI prosecution, but for titling and registration 
purposes as the legislature provided. 
B. Utility Type Vehicles Are Defined As Motor Vehicles Under Idaho Code Titles 49 & 67 
Instead of Defendant-Appellant's reverse, exclusionary type definition of a UTV via I.C. § 49-
123(2)(g), wouldn't it be practical and convenient if there was a definition for a "Utility Type Vehicle" 
or "UTV" 1n Title 49? In fact, the Idaho Legislature has done so. It is contained in one of the definition 
statutes for Title 49. Idaho Code § 49-122(8) has a specific definition for a UTV as follows: 
49-122. DEFINITIONS -- lJ .... 
(8) "Utility type vehicle" or "UTV" means a utility type vehicle or UTV as defined in section 
67-7101, Idaho Code. 
Naturally this leads us to LC. § 67-71 Ol, which means that Title 49. through I.C. § 49-122(8), 
incorporates the following by reference: 
67-710 I. DEFINITIONS. In this chapter: 
( 17) "Utility type vehicle" or "UTV'' means any recreational motor vehicle other than an ATV, 
motorbike or snowmobile as defined in this section, designed for and capable of travel over 
designated roads, traveling on four (4) or more tires, maximum width less than seventy-four 
(74) inches, maximum weight less than two thousand (2,000) pounds, and having a wheelbase 
of one hundred ten (I l 0) inches or less. A utility type vehicle must have a minimum width of 
fifty (50) inches, a minimum weight of at least nine hundred (900) pounds or a whee\base of 
over sixty-one (61) inches. Utility type vehicle does not include golf carts, vehicles specially 
designed to carry a disabled person, implements of hu:>bandry as defined in section 49-110(2), 
Idaho Code, or vehicles otherwise registered under title 49, Idaho Code. A "utility type vehicle" 
or "UTV" also means a recreational off-highway vehicle or ROV. 
(Emphasis added, also please note the UTVs are designed for both. travel on designated roads 
and off-highway under this definition). 
The key advisory board statute relating to off-road motor vehicle use for the Idaho Department 
of Parks and Recreation even refers to the tenn "motor vehicle" as part of the definition for the 
committee! 
67-7128. OFF-ROAD MOTOR VEHICLE ADVISORY COMMITTEE-- CREATION-- SE-
LECTION -- TERM OF OFFICE -- DUTY. (1) The park and recreation board shall appoint an 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF, P. 9 
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off-road motor vehicle advisory committee (ORMV) of nine (9) members. The membership of 
the advisory committee shall consist of three (3) members each from northern Idaho, south-
western Idaho, and southeastern rdaho. Two (2) members from each area shall represent the fol-
lowing groups: motorbikes, A TV or UTV riders and snowmobilers. One ( l) member interested 
in ORlVIV projects shall be appointed from each area without regard to the recreational activity 
in which that member participates and shall represent interests other than motorbike, A TV or 
UTV riders and snowmobilers. Each member of the advisory committee shall be chosen by the 
park and recreation board to serve a tenn of three (3) years, except that the term of the initial 
appointees shalt commence on the date of appointment and shall be of staggered lengths. Each 
member of the advisory committee shaU be a qua)ified eJector of the state. Duties shall include: 
(a) Representing the best interests of the ORMV users and activities which they represent in the 
district from which they are appointed; 
(b) Advising the department as to whether proposed ORMV projects meet the needs of ORMV 
users in that area; 
( c) Advising the department as to how funds can be used to rehabilitate areas on public or pri-
vate lands and how the department can assist in the enforcement of laws and regulations gov-
erning the use of off-road vehicles in the state of Idaho; 
(d) The three (3) motorbike, all-terrain vehicle or utility type vehicle representatives from the 
ORMV advisory committee shall advise the department on matters relating to the use of mon-
eys in the motorbike recreation account as provided for in section 67-7127, Idaho Code. 
(2) The committee shall be compensated as provided in section 59-509(f), Idaho Code, 
and authorized by the department. 
Similarly, there are multiple references in Title 67 indicating the first and original recreational 
motor vehicle, the snowmobile, as addressed in Barnes, supra, is and continues to be addressed as a 
"motor vehicle," not in contlict with Titles 49 and 18, but as part of a comprehensive statutory scheme.2 
2. 67-7110. RESTRICTIONS. It shall be unlawful for any person to drive or operate any snowmobile: 
(1) At a rate of speed greater than reasonable and prudent under the existing conditions. 
(2) In a negligent manner so as to endanger the person or property of another. or to cause injury 
or damage to either, or to harass, chase or annoy any wiJd game animals or birds or domestic animals. 
(3) Without a lighted headlight and taillight between the hours of dusk and dawn, or when upon 
or crossing any public roadway or highway, or when otherwise required for the safety of others. 
(4) Without an adequate braking device which may be operated by either hand or foot. 
{5) Without an adequate muffler, except when used in conjunction with pub1ic racing events. 
(6) Upon a public roadway or highway without a valid motor vehicle operator's license, unless 
the public roadway or h1ghway is closed to other motor vehicle travel. (emphasis added) 
67-7109. PROHIBITION AGAINST HIGHWAY OPERATION·- EXCEPTIONS. 
(3) The prohibition against operating snowmobiles upon highways and public roadways shall not apply 
to any highway or public roadway drifted or covered 'With snow to an extent that travel on it bv otl1er 
motor vehicles is impractical or impossible. (emphasis added). 
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C. Defendant-Appellant's Interpretation Would Create Multiple Nullities and 
Nonsensical Statutory imd Regulatory Results Contrary to Public Policy and Common 
Sense 
The Defendant-Appellant has championed the idea that continuing to follow the Idaho Supreme 
Court on the Barnes case and the in pari material doctrine somehow nullifies LC. § 67-7114 despite 
the continued differences in the statutes regarding the per se .08 BAC level in LC. § 18-8004 and the 
descriptions of areas of applications. See Slate v. Beard, 135 Idaho 64 \, 646, 22 P.3d 116 (Ct. App 
200l). Does LC. §67-7114 allow prosecution under the facts of the instant case if the location was 
limited to the private property of the church parking lot open to the public? That is not whac the 
language of that statute expressly provides. Is that a leap of interpretation and analysis to equate the 
two statutes in that regard in this case? Certainly this colUlsel knows of no recorded decision on that 
issue, but of course arguments may be made. 
But, there are other statutes in Titles 18, 19 or 67 using the tenn "motor vehicle" or "motor 
vehicles" that would not fare well with the Defendant-Appellants very strict and not so common sense 
definition. For example, LC. § 67-7114 or any other recreational motor vehicle regulation could not be 
utilized in Jndian Country located within the State as it would not relate to a motor vehicle.3 If 
someone had taken a shot at the occupants (7) in the Trusdall UTV in this case, that person could not 
have been charged with a felony under LC. § 18-3317.4 The State would have no regulatory or police 
3. 67-5101. STATE JuRISDlCTION FOR CIVIL AND CRI.\t!INAL ENFORCEMENT CONCERN-
ING CERTAIN MATTERS ARISING IN INDIAN COUNTRY. The state ofldaho, in accordance 
with the provisions of 67 Statutes at Large, page 5 89 (Public Law 280) hereby assumes and accepts ju-
risdic1ion for the civil and criminal enforcement of state laws and regulations concerning the following 
matters and purposes arising in Indian country located within this state, as Indian country is defined by 
title l 8, United States Code 1151, and obligates and binds this state to the assumption thereof: 
A. Compulsory school attendance 
B. Juvenile delinquency and youth rehabilitation 
C. Dependent, neglected and abused children 
D. Insanities and mental illness 
E. Public assistance 
F. Domestic relations 
G. Operation and management of motor vehicles upon highwavs and roads maintained by the 
coimty or state, or political subdivisions thereof. (emphasis added) 
4. 18-3 317. UNLA WFUI, DISCHARGE OF A FIREARM AT A DWELLING HOUSE, OCCUPIED 
BUILDING, VEHICLE OR MOBILE HOME. It shall be unla\\ful for any person to intentionally and 
unlawfully discharge a firearm at an inhabited dwelling house, occupied building, occupied motor ve-
hicle, inhabited mobile home, inhabited travel trailer, or inhabited camper. Any person violating the 
provisions of this section shall be guilty of a felony, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for 
a tenn noL to exceed fifteen ( 15) years. 
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authority to stop or police shipments of hazardous waste transported or brought in anywhere by UTV, 
pulled by farm tractors or similar excluded heavy equipment.5 Also, it would not constitute criminal 
trespass to run a UTV or a farm tractor through someone else's cultivated fields, destroying or 
damaging the same. 6 
The record is also clear that the Defendant-Appellant did not appeal the ALS decision 
subjecting her to testing and suspension of driving privileges under LC. §§ 8002 and 8002A for 
operating a motor vehicle while wider the influence of alcohol or other intoxicating substances. How 
many bites al lhe apple is Trusdall allowed? In fact and at law, there is no conflict, no nullity, no 
warranted constraint on the charging discretion available to the Prosecution: 
Based on the doctrine of in pari rnateria, we hold that driving a snowmobile on a public 
roadway while intoxicated is covered by both LC. § 18-8004 and LC.§ 67-7110(2), that there is 
no conflict and that the State had the discretion to prosecute Barnes under either statute. This 
Court has held that statutes which are in pari material are to be construed together to further 
legislative intent See Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax Camm'n, 124 ldaho I, 4, 855 
P.2d 462, 465 (1993). The Court has defined inpari material as follows: 
"The rule that statutes in pari material are to be construed together means that each leg-
islative act is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the same matter or subject. 
As used in this section, "inhabited" means currentJy being used for dwelling purposes, whether 
occupied or not. 
S. 67-2917. HAZARDOUS WASTE. Wherever hazardous waste, as defined in section 39-4403, Idaho 
Code, is being transported within the state, within the state to without the state, or from without the 
state to within the state, the operator or owner of the motor vehicle or trailer, as defined in chapter I, 
title 49, Idaho Code, transporting hazardous waste is hereby required to stop at such ports of entry or 
checking stations and submit to inspection or weighing for compliance with the laws of the state of 
Idaho. AdditionalJy, such owner or operator of the motor vehicle or trailer transporting hazardous 
waste is hereby required and directed to allow employees of the department of environmental quality, 
authorized Idaho transportation department employees or the state police or any peace officer on duty 
to inspect and review all manifests and bills of lading to ensure that such hazardous waste is being 
shipped in a manner which will not endanger the health, welfare or safety of the citizens of the state of 
Idaho and is being shipped in compliance with the laws of the state of Idaho and any rules promulgated 
pursuant thereto.( emphasis added) 
6. 18-701 l. CRIMINAL TRESPASS-· DEFINITION AND PUNISHMENT .... 
(2) No motor vehicle shall be willful1y or intentionally driven into, upon, over or through any private 
land actively devoted to cultivated crops without the consent of the owner of the land or the tenant, 
lessee or agent of the owner of the land actively devoted to cultivated crops. Violation of the provisions 
of this section shall be a misdemeanor. For the purpose of this subsection, motor vehicle shall be 
defined as set forth in sections 49-114 and 49-l23, Idaho Code. Land actively devoted to cultivated 
crops shall be delined as land that is used to produce field crops including, but not limited to, grains, 
foed crops, legumes, fruits and vegetables. (emphasis added)(emphasis added). 
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Statutes are in part materia when they relate to the same subject. Such statutes are taken 
together and construed as one system, and the object is to carry into effect the intention. 
Tt is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by one 
spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent and hannonious in its several parts 
and provisions. For the purpose of learning the intention, all statutes relating to the same 
subject are to be compared, and so far as still in force brought into harmony by interpre-
tation." 
Id (quoting ,"4,!eyers v. City of Idaho Falls, 52 Idaho 81, 89-90, 11 P.2d 626, 629 ( 1932)). How-
ever, where two statutes appear to apply to the same case or subject matter, the specific statute 
will control over the more general statute. See V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho Tran.sp. Dep'r, 131 Idaho 
482, 483 ,959 P .2d 463, 464 ( 1998); State v. Wilson, l 07 Idaho 506, 508, 690 P .2d 1338, 1340 
(l 984). 
In the present case, both 1.C. § 18-8004 and l.C. § 67-7110(2) deal with the subject of 
operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. However, they are both specific in different as-
pects; I.C. § 67-7110(2) is specific with respect to the type of motor vehicle being operated by 
the intoxicated person, i.e., a snowmobile, while LC. § 18-8004( 1 )(a) is specific about where 
the motor vehicle is being operated and what constitutes intoxication. Despite the fact that these 
statutes can both be considered more specific than the other in certain aspects, they can be con~ 
strued harmoniously under the facts of this case. Here, Barnes was operating her motor vehicle, 
a snowmobile, on a pubticroadway or highway while intoxicated. A snowmobile operator is 
generally not allowed to operate a snowmobile on a highway or public roadway. See l.C. § 67-
7109. Snowmobiles are generally operated on groomed snowmobile trails or other areas which 
are not highways or public roadways. Thus, because Barnes elected to operate her sno~mobile 
on a highway or public roadway while intoxicated, her actions came within the purview of both 
LC.§ 67-7110(2) and LC. § 18·8004(l)(a). Tbe prosecutor therefore had the discretion to charge 
Barnes under either statute. State v. Vetsch, \01 Idaho 595, 596, 618 P.2d 773, 774 (1980); State 
v. Phillips, 117 ldaho 23, 27, 784 P .2d 353, 357 (Ct.App.1989). 
Barnes. supra, 133 Idaho at 382. 
CONCLUSION 
The record and applicable law do not justify reversal of Barnes and perhaps the best example of 
the in pari materia doctrine that exists in Idaho law. Common sense, the graduated escalation of DUI 
enforcement and penalties that has been paying dividends to our society in saving lives, heartache and 
productivity; and legislative intent all require that the denial of the Defendant-Appellant's Motion to 
Dismiss be upheld on this appeal. This case has shown that the system works as it is and that even 
under the harsh facts of the present case, but with a Defendant with an excellent record, unlikely tn 
offend again may exercise her withheld judgment and have the opportunity to excel in a new chosen 
profession teaching children due to the mutual opportunity provided by the Defendant-Appellant's 
accountability and the charging and plea discretion exercised by the Prosecution. 
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DATED this 5th day of June, 2012 I 
Kenneth R. Arment 
Valley County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceeditlgs 
On June 25, 2011, at approximately 9:30 p.m. Rhonda Trusdall was spinning circles in a 
utility-terrain vehicle (2006 Polaris Ranger) in the Catholic Church parking lot just north of 
Cascade, Idaho. Along with Ms. Trusdall in the utility-terrain vehicle wen: six children. Ms. 
Trusdal1 was approached by Valley County Sheriff Officer Tom Cimbalik who was driving 
southbound on Highway 55. Following the administration of field sobriety tests Ms. Trusdall 
was placed in handcuffs and arrested for driving under the influence. Ms. Trusdall then 
submitted to a breath test and was eventually cited with driving under the influence in violation 
offdaho Code§§ 18-8004(l)(a) & 1 &-8005(1). Ms. Trusdall was also cited for injury to a child 
in violation ofldaho Code § l 8- l 501(3), failure to a carry driver's license, in violation of1daho 
Code§ 49-316, and transportation of an aJcohoJic beverage, in violation ofldabo Code§ 23-50.5. 
Ms. Trusdall subsequently filed a Motion to Dismiss and supporting memorandum 
arguing she could not be charged with driving under the influence pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-
8004( l )(a) because a utility-terrain vehicle ("UTV") designed for off road use is not a "motor 
vehicle" under [daho law. The focus of the motion ;vas that the general driving under the 
in tluence statute in Idaho requires that a person drive or be in actual physical control of a "motor 
vehicle." And a "motor vehicle" is specifically defined as "( c ]very vehicle which is self-
propelled, and for the purpose of titling and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety 
standards as defined in section 49-107, Idaho Code." LC.§ 49-123(2)(g). Since the UTV 
operated by Ms. Trusdall does not meet the federal motor vehicle safety .standards, it is not a 
"motor vehicle" by definition. Thus, Ms. Trusdall can be prosecuted for operating a UTV under 
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the influence in violation of Idaho Code§ 67·7114, but she could not be charged with operating a 
"motor vehicle" under the influence in violatfon of Idaho Code § l 8·8004{ l )(a). 
In response to Ms. Trusdall's motion and memorandum, the State elected not to submit a 
brief and instead relied upon the affidavit of Deputy Valley County Prost>cuting Attorney Ken 
Arment which appended the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order entered in an 
administrative license suspension proceeding involving Ms. Trusda!J, as well as the resulls of a 
motor vehicle records request for the UTV at issue. Oral argument was held on September 15, 
2011, during which the State conceded that Ms. Trusda!l's lJTV does not meet the federal motor 
vehicle safety standards and suggested that the legislature may have simply screwed up when it 
recently re-defined a "motor vehicle" too :1arrowly. Also on September 15. 2011, because she 
elected to pursue her motion to dismiss, the State fi1ed an Amended Criminal Complaint 
charging Ms. Trusdall with a total often (10) misdemeanors and six {6) infractions. 
On October27, 2011, the Coun issued its Memorandum Opinion Denying Motion to 
Dismiss finding that Ida.ho Code§ 49·426(3), an unrelated statute addressing operating fo·es, was 
dispositive of whether one can be charged under the general driving under the influence statute 
because it states in part that the "requirements oftitle 18 and chapters 2, 3, 6, 8, I 2, 13, and 14, 
title 49, Idaho Code, shall apply to the operation of any all-terrain vehicle or motorbike upon 
highways." On November 8, 201 l, Ms. Trusdail filed a Motion for Reconsideration 
arguing the trial court's reliance upon Idaho Code§ 49-426(3) was misplaced . . \tis. TrusdaU's 
Motion for Reconsideration was denied. 
On February 2, 2012, pursuant to an agreement between the parties, Ms. Trusdall entered 
c.onditional pleas of guilty to the charges of driving under the influence. in violation of Jdaho 
2 
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Code§§ 18-8004( l)(a) & 18-8005(1) and transportation of an alcoholic beverage, in violation of 
Idaho Code§ 23-505. The remaining charges were dismissed upon the State's motion. This 
timely appeal followed. 
III. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Did the trial court err in relying on Idaho Code§ 49-426(3) to deny Ms. Trusdall's 
Motion to Dismiss and by implicitly finding that a utility-terrain vehicle ("UTV") designed for 
off road use is a "motor vehicle" under (daho law. 
IV. ARGUMF.NT 
A. Standard of Review 
Appellate courts, as the District Court is acting in its capacity here, exercises free review 
over the interpretation of a statute and its application to the facts. State v. Yzaguirre, 144 Idaho 
471, 474, 163 P.3d 1183, 1186 (2007) {citing VFP VC v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 331, !09 
P.3d 714, 719 (2005)). The standard of review for interpretation ofa statute was recently 
summarized by the Idaho Supreme Court as follows: 
The object of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. The 
literal words of the statute provide the bcs1 guide to legislative intent, and 
therefore, the interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the 
statute. The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed 
legislative intent is contrary or unless the plain meaning leads to absurd results. 
Th is Court gives the words of a statute their plain, usual, und ordinary meaning. 
Moreover. this Court must consider all sections of applicable statutes together to 
determine the intent of the legislature. 
If the language of a statute is capable of more than one reasonable construction it 
is ambiguous. When a statute is ambiguous, it must be construed to mean what 
the legislature intended it to mean. To determine that intent, we examine not only 
the literal words of the statute, but also the rcawnableness of proposed 
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. 
3 
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State v. Doe, 147 ldaho 326, 327-28, 208 P.3d 730, 731-32 (2009) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). Furthermore: 
It is incumb¢nt upon a court to give a statute an interpretatfon which will not 
render it a nullity. Where ambiguity exists as to the elements of a crime, this 
Court will strictly construe the criminal statute in favor of the defendant. 
State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 P.Jd 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted) (emphasis added); accord State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 274, 92 P.3d 521, 
524 (2004) ("where the ambiguity exists as to the elemcnls of or potential sanctions for a crime, 
this Court wi11 strictly construe the statute in favor of the defendant"). 
B. A Vtility-Te"ain Vehicle is Not a "Motor Ve/tide" As a Matier of Law 
Ms. Trusdall should not have lxen charged with driving under the influence under Idaho 
Code§ 18-8004(l)(a) because a utility-terrain vehicle designed for off road use is not a "motor 
vehicle" under Idaho law. 
The general driving under the influence statute in Idaho provides: 
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any 
other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, dnigs and/or any 
other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as 
defined in subsection ( 4) of this section, or more, as shown by analysis of his 
blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle 
within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or 
private property open to the public. 
I.C. § 18-8004(a)( 1) (emphasis added}. 
Idaho Code section 49- l 23(2)(g) defines "motor vehicle" as follows: 
Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of titling and 
registration mtreL'i federal motor vehicle safety slood{!,llls as defined Jn see:ti.QJJ 
49-107. [daho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved solely by 
human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and motorized 
wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling or 
4 
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registration requiretncnts under title 49, rdaho Code. 
l.C. § 49-l23(2)(g) (emphasis added). 
as: 
And the "federal motor vehicle safety standards" (FM VSS) are defined in section 49-107 
[T]hose safely stnndards established by the nati.onal highway traffic safety 
adminis1ration, ooder title 49 CFR part 500-599, for the safe constmction and 
manufacturing of self-propelled motorized vehicles for operation on public 
highways. Such vehicles as originally designed and manufactured shall be so 
certified by the manufacturer to meet the federal motor vehicle safety standards or 
the standards in force for a given model year or as certified by 1he national 
highway traffic safety administration. 
LC. § 49-107(5) (emphasis added}. Therefore, in order to be treated as a "motor vehicle" under 
Jdaho Code § 18-8004, the national highway traffic safety administration must have promulgated 
safoty regulations under title 49 CfR part 500-599 for the utility-terrain vehicle operated by Ms. 
Trusdall. 
However, and most importantly, neither the federal motor vehicle safety standards nor 
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Parts 500-599 apply to utility-terrain vehicles 
designed for off road use such as the one operated by Ms. Trusdall in this case. Parts 500-599 of 
the CFR are absent any safety regulations regarding utility-terrain vehicles. As eKplained by the 
national highway traffic satety administration itself, "[v]ehicles such as race cars, dirt bikes, and 
all-terrain vehicles that are not primarily manufactured for on-road use do not qualify as motor 
vehicles and are therefore not regulated by NHTSA." National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration. "Requirements for Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Molar Vehicle 
5 
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Equipment," p. 7 (November 16, 2010)1 (emphasis added). 
Ms. Tru.sdall simply was not operating a "motor vehicle" by law and this Court must 
therefore reverse the magistrate court's decision and remand with instructions to dismiss the 
charge of driving under the influence in violation of Idaho Code § J 8-8004(1 )(a) and transporting 
an alcoholic beverage in violation of Idaho Code§ 23-505(2) for lack ofjurisdiction. Bolh 
statutes require that Ms. Trusdall be operating a "motor vehicle," which she was not. 
C. The Intention of Idaho Code Section. 18-800.tf(l)(a) Wa' Not Jo Prosecute the Act of 
Operating a Utility-Terrain OI' All-Terrain Type Vehicle 
In addition to not operating a "motor vehicle" as a Ini:lt\er of law, Ms. Trusdall was also 
improperly charged under Idaho Code § l 8-8004. Upon the stipulated facts that Ms. Trusdall 
was operating a utility-terrain veh1cle designed and licensed for off road use, charging Ms. 
Trusdall under the general driving wider the influence statute impermissibly rendered ldaho Code 
§ 67-7114 a nullity. Section 67-7114 reads: 
Operation under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating 
substance. Any person driving or operating a snowmobile, motorbike, utility type 
vehicle, specialty off-highway vehicle or all-terrain vehicle under the influence of 
alcohnl, drugs or any other intoxicating substance on a public roadway or highway 
or off-highway shall be guilty ofa misdemeanor. 
LC. § 67-7114. 
Ms. Trusdall is wel1 aware of the doctrine of in pari materia and acknowledges the 
holding in State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 3 78, 987 P.2d 290 ( l 999). Any reliance on Barnes 
however is misplaced and should be rejected because Barnes is distinguishable and not 
controlling here. Jn Barnes, the defendant argued he could not be charged under the general 
1 Available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/maninfo/newManf.pdf (last visited May 13, 
2012). 
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driving under the influence statute since he Wa'i operating a :mov.mobile while under the 
influence. The Barnes Court, limiting its decision to the circumstances in that case, held that 
under the doctrine of in pari materia, the infraction of operating a snowmobile under the 
influence is not in conflict with Idaho Code § 18-8004 and therefore the prosecutor "had the 
discretion to prosecute Barnes under either statuie." Id. at 294, 987 P.2d at 382. 
Jn reaching this conclusion the Barnes Court defined in pari materia as follows: 
The rule that statutes in pari rnateria are to be construed together means that each 
legislative act is to be interpreted with other nets relating to the same matter or 
subject. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same subject. Such 
statutes are taken together and construed as one system, and the object is to carry 
into effect the intention. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relat1ng to one 
subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent 
and harmonious in its sevens.l. parts and provisions. For the purpose of 1eaming 
the intention, all statutes relating to the same subject are to be compared, and so 
far as still jn force brought into harmony by interpretation. 
Id., citing Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 124 [daho J, 4, 855 P.2d 462, 465 
( 1993 ). Simply put, statJ.tes which are in. part materia are to be cunstrued together to further 
legislative intent. State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 382, 987 P.2d 290, 294 (l9<)9). 
However, when 1wo statutes appeal' to apply to the same case or subject matter, the more 
specific-st.atute will control over the more general statute. Jd., citing V-.1 Oil Co. · v. Idaho 
Transp. Dep 't, 131 Idaho 482, 483, 959 P .2d 463, 464 (1998). Similarly, when two statutes 
cannot be construed "harmoniously," "the more specific of the two statutes will prevail." State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856, 858-60, 153 P.3d 1202, 1203-05 (Ct. App. 2006); see a/sQ, United 
Swtes v. Estate of Romani, .523 U.S. 517, 532 (1998) (later, more specific statute governs). 
Here, Idaho Code § 67-7114 and Idaho Code § 18-8004 may relate to similar suf:,ject 
matter but they cannot be viewed as truly harmonious. Idaho Code§ 67-7114 specifically 
7 
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addresses conduct involving recreational vehicles, i.e. utility-ten·ain vehicles, whereas, Idaho 
Code § 18-8004 applies to any "motor vehicle."2 It is obvious the Idaho Legislature intended the 
conduct at issue in the present case to be governed by Section 67-7114. This Court must 
presume rhe legislature means what it says in a statute otherwise the incorporation of public 
roadways or highways in Section 67-7114 is meaningless and renders the statute a nullity. 
Moreover, unlike the former version of Idaho Code§ 67-71l0 which the defendant in 
Barnes argued was applicable to hlm, Idaho Code§ 67-7114 specifically and unequivocally 
applies to Ms. TrusdaJl. The former version of fdaho Code§ 67-7110 was an unusually broad 
statute regarding the general rules governing the operation ofa snowmobile. To the contrary, 
Idaho Code§ 67-7114 deals precisely with operating a recreational vehicle under the influence of 
alcohol. Moreover, the defendant in Barnes was attempting to escape criminal liability because 
Section 67-7110 was merely an infraction. Ms. Trusdall acknowledges Idaho Code§ 67-7114 is 
a misdemeanor crime and has never attempted to preclude prosecution of such crime. 
Additionally. the Court of Appeals has recently reiterated that when two statutes 
arguably apply the most specific and more recently enacted statute will govern over an older and 
more geoeraJ statute. See Stene v. Callaghan, l4J Idaho 856, 859, J .531'.Jd l202, 1205 (Ct .App. 
2006). In Callaghan, the Court of Appeals held that although there are two statutory :schemes 
dealing with the subject matter at issue, the legislative intent was clear that "forgery of a 
certificate of insurance would be punished as a misdemeanor, not as a felony .... " Id. In 
reaching this conclusion the Court of Appeals relied upon the canon of statutory co11struction that 
2 As discussed above, an utility-terrain vehicle is not a "motor vehicle" tmder Idaho Code § 18-
8004. 
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"[w]here a hannonious construction is impossible, the more specific of the two statutes wiJI 
prevail." Id. at 858-859, 153 P.3d at 1204-05. 
The same is true in this case. Because Idaho Code§ 67-7114 specifically deals with the 
subject matter of Ms. Trusdall's case, this Court must reverse the magistrate's decision and 
remand wi1h instructions to dismiss the charge of driving under the influence in violation of 
Idaho Code§ 18-8004(l)(a) and transporting an alcoholic beverage in violation ofldaho Code§ 
23-505(2) for lack of jurisdiction. 
D. The Rule of Lenity At~o Compelled /Jismissal 
The Rule ofLenity states that crjminaJ statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the 
defendant. Stute v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 379, 380, 859 P.2d 1387, 1399 (1993) (affinningtrial 
court's dismissal of theft charge based upon application uf tbe Rule ofLenity to statute of 
limi1ation), overruled nn other grounds in State v. Maidwe/1, 137 Idaho 424, 50 P.3d 439 (2<102). 
In other words, to the extent ldaho Code§ 67-7114 is ambiguous or if there is some doubt as to 
whctbcr Idaho Code § 67-7114 and Idaho Code § l R-8004 can be construed together, the Rufe of 
Lenity should have compelled the magistrate court to construe the statutes and their application 
in Ms.·TrusdaU's favor. Brown v. Slate, 137 Idaho 529, 536-37, SO P.3d 1024. l03i-32 (Ct. 
App. 2002). There can be no room for prosecutorial discretion in this case. 
Similarly, though a utility-terrain vehicle by law is nut a "motor vehicle," should there be 
any question or ambiguity, this Court, as the magistrate court should have, must construe the 
statutes and regulations in Ms. Trusdall's favor pursuant to the Rule ofLcnity. 
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E. The Trial Court's Re/imtce Upon Idaho Code§ 49-426(.J) Wns Misplaced and 
Renders Idaho Co,/e § 6 7-7114 a N ul/ity 
As explained above, premised upon a plain meaning interpretation of the literal words of 
the statutes in question, a UTV is not a "motor vehicle" by definition. See I.C. § 49- I 23(2)(g). 
Nonetheless, without making specific findings as to whether a UTV falls under the definition of a 
"motor vt:hicle," even though it doe:. not meet the federal motor vehicle safety standards, or 
whether section 49- l 23(2)(g) is ambiguous, which would require that it be construed in Ms. 
Trusdall's favor, the magistrnte court relied upon an unrelated statute, Idaho Code§ 49-426(3), to 
hold in its Memorandum Opinion Denying Motion to Dismiss ("Memorandum Opinion") that 
persons in Idaho operating a urv can be charged under either Idaho Code§§ 18-8004 or 67-
7ll4. 
First and foremost, the magistrate court's reliance on Idaho Code§ 49-426(3) 
impennissibly renders Idaho Code§ 67-7114 a nullity. State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 641, 646, 22 
P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001) ("It is 'incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation 
which will not render it a nullity."' quoting Stall! v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 447, 807 P.2d J 282, 
1285 (Ct. App. 1991)). Section 67-7114 becomes a nullity when the magistrate coun concluded 
that section 67-7 l 14 applies to "vehicles whecher on a public roadway or highway or off~ 
highway." Memorandum Opinion, p.4. In reality then, there is no difference between section 67-
7114 or section J &-8004(a)( l) which also applies to motor vehicles on ''a highway, street or 
bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public." Under the magistrate court's 
ruling, botb statutes are applicable to vehicles operated any place in the ~rate other than privare 
property not open to the public. Idaho Code§ 67-7114 thus becomes a nullity which is not 
10 
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permitted and is unequivocally contrary to the legislative intent behind the statute or it would not 
have been enacted in 1999.3 
Second. the plain language of section 49-426(3) as well as the legislative intent in 
enacting the statute requires a finding that Ms. Trusdall cannot be charged with violating ldaho 
Code § 18-8004( l )(a). The parties, as well as the magistrate court agree - Ms. TrusdaJI was 
operating a UTV in a parking lot. Whereas section 49-426(3) expressly states title 18 shall only 
apply to "the operation of any all-terrain vehicle, utility type vehicle or motorbike upon 
highways." Notwithstanding that section 49-426(3) is an unrelated statute and not applicable to 
the analysis of whether or not a UTV is a "motor vehicle" as a matter of law in Idaho, it 
nevertheless surely docs not apply to the circumstances in this case. Therefore, any reliance upon 
section 49-426(3) was misplaced and contrary to the statute's plain language. 
Furthermore, the specific provision of section 49-426{3) relied on by the magistrate court 
was not enacted for the purpose cited in the \1emorandum Opinion. Paren three of section 49-
426 was enacted in 2000 as part of House Bill No. 561 and when originally adopted read as 
f'ollows: 
Any political subdivision of the state ofidaho may, but only after sufficient public 
notice is given and a public hearing held, adopt local ordinances designating 
highways or sections of highways under its jurisdiction upon which unregistered 
all-terrain vehicles and motorcycles may be operated. No controlled access 
> Proposed as House Bill 55, Idaho Code§ 67-7114 was enacted "to make the penalty for 
operating a snowmobile [and all-terrain vehidesJ while under the influence of intoxicating liquor 
or narcotics or other intoxicating substance consistent with the same acts committed while 
operating a motor vehicle." Statement of Purpose, HB. 55 (1999) (emphasis added). 
Interestingly, even in the Statement of Purpose the Legislature recognized a difference between 
all-terrain vehicles and motor vehicles. 
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highways shall be designated under this subsection. Thi:: reguirements~ of title 18 
and cba,pters 6. 8, 12. 1 J and I 4. tiOe 49. ldaho Cod~iib111L~tg the og_eratiQn 
of anY unregistered motorcycle and aH-t:i;rrnin vehide uoon such designated 
highways. Costs related to the posting of signs on such designated highways or 
sections of highways indicating the ordinance are eligible for reimbursem~nt 
through the motorbike recreation account created in section 67-7126, Idaho Code. 
H.B. No. 561 (2000) (emphasis added). The purpose of this statute was to "giverJ political 
subdivisions (lf the State of ldaho the ability to designate highways and ~ctions of highways for 
unregistered off-highway motorbike <md all-terrain vehicle use." Statement of Purpose, H.B. 
561(2000). 
Clearly the Legislature's intent was not to render Idaho Code§ 67-7114 a nuHity. This is 
further evidenced by the fact that the year prior, in 2008, the Legislature revised section 6 7-7114 
to specifically re~ ..,....49-426(3) as 'follows: 
67-7114. Operation under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other 
intoxicating substance. Any person driving or operating a snowmobile, 
motorbike, utility type vehicle or all-terrain vehicle under the influence of alcohol, 
drugs or any other intoxicating substance on a public roadway or bighway,J!!l. 
authorized in this chnpter or in section 49-4 26{3) and ( 4 ), Idaho Code, or off road 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
I.C. § 67-7114 (2008); S.L. 2008, ch. 409, § 11 (emphasis adtled).5 'l11is specific cross-reference 
4 Moreover, Idaho Code § 18-8004(1 )(a) is not a "tcquirement" but rather a prohibition against 
driving under the influence. 
5 In 2009, the Idaho Legislature made one last revision lo the statute so that at the time the State 
charged Ms. Trusdall it read as follows: 
67-7114. Operation under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other 
intoxicating substance. Any person driving or operating a snowmobile, 
motorbike, utility type vehicle, specialty off-highway vehicle or all-tena.in vehicle 
under the inl1nence of alcohol, drugs or any 01her intoxicating !>Ubstance on a 
public roadway or highway or off-highway shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
l.C. § 67-7114 (2009); S.L 2009, ch. 157, § 13. 
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to section 49-426(3) is unequivocal support for the fact that the Legislature sought to have 
persons such as Ms. TrusdaU, who are alleged to have operated a UTV under the influence, 
prosecuted under Idaho Code § 67 -7114. 
Even more compt:lling is that the Legislature in 2009 revised the definition of a "motor 
vehicle" to not indu<le all-terrain or utility-terrain vehicles.6 As part of Senate Bill No. 1098, a 
"motor vehicle" was spei.:ifit.:ally defined as: 
Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of titling and 
registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in section 
49-l 07, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vt:hicles moved solely by 
human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and motorized 
wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling or 
registration requirements under title 49, ldaho Code. 
I.C. § 49~123(2)(g.) (2009); S.L. 2009, ch. 157, § 13. 
Pursuant to this definition, as Ms. Trusdall set forth above, a UTV is not a "motor 
vehicle" because a UTV docs not meet the federal motor vehicle safely standards as defined in 
section 49- l 07, Idaho Code. Even the State conceded at oral argument that a UTV does not meet 
these federal safety standards. The Legislature has made clear, through its enactment of section 
67-7114 and its definition of''motor vehicle," that operating a UTV under the influence cannot 
be prosecuted under section 18-8004(1 )(a). 
To the extent that the plain language and legislative intent of sections 49-l 23(2)(g) & 49-
426{3) does not preclude the State from charging Ms. Trusdall with violating Idaho Code§ 18-
8004(l)(a). the~e statutory provisions must then be found ambiguous. As such, the Rule of 
6 ft was part of this same Senate Bill that the final revisions to Idaho Code § 6 7 -7 l 14 as noted in 
footnote 3 were enacted. 
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Lcnity requirt:s that they be strictly construed in favor of the defendant. Slate v. Barnes, 124 
ldaho 379, 380, 859 P.2d 1387, 1399 (1993) (affirming trial court's dismissal ofthett charge 
based upon application of the Rul~ of Lenity to statute of limitation), uverruled on other grounds 
in Slate v. Maidwcll, 13 7 Idaho 424, 50 P.3d 439 (2002). In other words, to lhe extent ldaJm 
Code§§ 49-123(2)(g) or 49-426(3) are ambiguous, the Ruic of Lcnity compels this Court to 
construe the statutes and their application in Ms. Trusdall's favor and revers;; the magistrate 
court's decision. Brown v. State, 137 Idaho 529, 536-37, 50 P.3d 1024, 1031-32 (Ct. App. 
2002). 
Finally, simply because a statute governing the registration foes for all-terrain vehicles 
contains a provision referencing title l8 docs not obviate the requirement that a person be 
operating a "motor vehicle" in order to violate Idaho Code § I 8-8004( I )(a). 7 Operating a "'motor 
vehicle" is a fundamental premise and requirement in order to be prosecuted under section 18-
8004(l){a). lfthe magistrate court's rationale and findings are accepted, an unlicensed fifteen 
{I 5) year old could be charged with driving without privileges, in violation of Idaho Code § 18-
800 I, a misdemeanor, for turning around on his dirt bike in the same church parking lot as Ms. 
Trusdall. This would be the absurd result of statutory interpretation the Idaho appellate courts 
continually caution against. 
1 Arguably, one could violate other provisions of title 18 while operating a UTV because some 
statutes do nut require the use of a "motor vehicle'" but simply require the operation of a 
"vehicJe." which has a much broader definition. See, e.g., J.C. § 18-8007 - Leaving the Scene of 
an Accident ("The driver of any vehicle that has been involved in an accident .... "). While in 
the example above, driving withcm1 privileges requires operation of a "motor vehicle.'' See l.C. § 
18-800 I. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For all the reasons set forth above, Ms. Tru.~dall requests that the magistrate court's 
Memorandum Opinion Denying Motion to Dismiss be reversed and the mutter remanded with 
instructions that Ms. TnisdaJJ's conditiomd pleas of guiJty to the charges of Jriving under the 
iotluence, jn violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-8004( I )(a) & 18-8005( 1 ), and transportation of an 
alcohollc beverage, in violation ofldaho Code § 23-505, be withdrawn and these charges be 
dismissed. 
Respectfully submitted this May 14, 2012. 
lel1Te1&,m>n ·---
Attorney for Rhonda Trusdall 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on May 14, 2012, l caused a true and correct copies of the 
foregoing to be mailed to: 
Mr. Ken Arment 
Deputy Valley County Prosecutor 
P.O. Box 1350 
Cascade, fD 836 l J 
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P.O. Box 1350 
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Facsimile (208) 382-7!24 
lN THE DISTRICT C0l3RT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN Al'-iD FOR VALLEY COUNTY 
THE ST A TE OF lDAHO 
Plaintit1~ 
vs. 
RHONDA L. TRUSDALL, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~-) 
CASE NO. CR-l l-l684-C 
MEMORANDU~1 REGARDING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR RECO~SIDERA TJON 
COMES NOW the State and provides the following Memorandum regarding Defendant's 
:V1otion for Reconsideration: 
THE COURT'S RULING IS CORRECT 
State v, Burnes, 133 Idaho 378, 987 P.2d 290. is the controlling case with regard to the 
Defendant's motions. Acceptance of the Defendant's argument would turn the doctrine of in pari 
materia on its ear. The overwhelming movemen1 for more accountability and enhanced penalties 
for driving under the influence has been a constant political (and successful) force for decades. 
Even on this holiday week~nd. news reports of local law enforcement utilizing federal grant 
funds to pay for increased DCI enforcement is making the news. 
LC § 67-7114 provides another tool; another option. to hold persons responsible for their 
actions in drinking and driving while using recreational motor vehicles. It is not designed to 
exculpate intoxicated DU1 drivers from offenses covered by LC § 18-8004. In this case, the 
Defendant was arrested at a parking lot open to the public and accessible only by public road. 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM. Pg. 
--------- - --
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The issue of the arrest occurring in the parking lot as a defense was not one addres::.ed or briefed. 
If it had been. the State would have shown that access to the property could have only been by 
public road. 
The Detendant wants to avoid responsibility for her criminal driving behavior and 
endangerment to the minor children who were not restrained by seat belts nor protected by the 
required safety helmets. But the basis of this defense is the proposition that UTV vehicles are not 
licensed and the legislature intended to de-criminalize drunken; reckless; and dangerous behavior 
on the kind the Defendant committed in this case. 
noth of these propositions are absurd. The urv \Vas licensed and registered. The 
Legislature has not sought to lessen the consequences of intoxicated driving and related child 
endangerment. 
The State provided additional definitions at oral argument, including LC§ 67- 7102 which 
defines L:TVs as a recreational ''motor vehicle." The State also offered a logical and cogent 
explanation to reconcile the provisions which the Defendant asserts are at odds: If federal 
authorities determine UTVs, Semi-Trailers and other motor vehicles do not warrant safety 
standards, then Idaho will accept that and license and register them under applicable law. The 
Legislature \•.:as not turning over its state sovereignty to the federal regulators on what is a motor 
vehicle 'Jnder ldaho law. 
Defendant st HI refuses to recognize or address the issue of how the Defendant's UTV and 
other lJTVs are in fact licensed and registered a~ motor vehicles in Idaho. Defendant has no 
explanation for this result Instead this key fact is ignored and the Defendant arg'..les that UTVs 
are not and can't be licensed and registered pursuant to her interpretation of LC§ 49-123(2)(g) 
because there are no federal safety regulations for UTVs in the federal register. Yet, her UTV 
was licensed and registered as a motor vehicle. How is that logical? It isn't. That is the ultimate 
basis of Defendant's legal position. lt can not stand. 
DATED this 23rd day ofNovember. 201 l ,/ __ 
~LtL:$! 
Kenneth R. Arment 
Pg. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I caused a true and correct copy of the forgoing document to be faxed to the following on 
the date set forth below. 
Jeffrey Brownson 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Dartlett LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise, ID 83701 
FAX: 208 345-8274 
DATED this 23rd day of November, 2011. 
·"L !! ~i~ ·. /. I .I I I c..,J4,,rvt/.""--_· __ _ 
Kenneth R. Arment 
STATE'S MEMORANDUM, Pg. 
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Case No ··----.J~st No. 
Fired__ :a·~-
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DJ~· PM 
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHOt IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF VALLEY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RHONDA L. TRUSDALL, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CR 2011-1684*C 
MEMORANDLM OPINION 
DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS 
The facts that are germane to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss are not in dispute. Simply 
put, Defendant was cited for Driving Under the Influence, among other things, pursuant to I.C. 
§ 18-8004(1 )(a), after an officer observed h.er driving erratically in a parking lot open to the 
public, owned by the Catholic Church, just outside of Cascade, Valley County, Idaho. The 
incident occurred June 25, 2011. The Defendant is charged with other Title 18 violations as 
well, Injury to Children, (J.C. § 18-1501(3) by allegedly transporting children in her motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. 
The Defendant takes the position that she was not driving a "motor vehicle" by statutory 
definition, as required for prosecution under the code section above and as defined by I.C. §49· 
l 23(2))g); §49-107; and the federal motor vehicle safety (FMVS) standards as defined and 
referred to in section 49-107. Defendant was driving a four-wheeled, motor powered vehicle that 
is defined as a Utility Terrain Vehicle (UTV), a 2006 Polaris Ranger. The parties do not dispute 
that UTV's are not regulated by FMVS standards. 
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Defendant argues that she can only be properly prosecuted in this case pursuant to IC § 
67-7114, which is an impaired driving charge that is specific to operation of UTV's. The State 
asserts that, pursuant to State v. Barnes, t 3 3 Idaho 378, 987 P.2d 290, this case is in pari 
materia, and tbus, pursuant to the ruling in Barnes is subject to prosecution under either statute, 
I.C. §18-8004 or I.C. §67-7114. (and also§ 18-1501(3)) 
The amendments to Idaho Code and the interplay offederal regulations are now quite 
specific to operation ofUTVs, unlike when Barnes was decided. The statute at issue in Barnes 
was LC. 67 ~ 7110(2), which was and still is, an infraction statute, prohibiting negligent operation 
of a sno\\mobile, whereas I.C. 67-7114, now also in effect, reads as follows: 
"Any person driving or operating a snowmobile or al1-terrain vehicle under the intluence 
of alcohol, drugs or any orher intoxicating substance on a public roadway or highway, as 
authorized in this chapter, or off-road shall be guilty ofa misdemeanor." 
The State relies on the holding by the Administrative Hearing Examiner in Ms. Trusdall's 
companion case relating to Administrative License Suspension proceedings. (titled Idaho D.L. 
YC35518J, File No. 2120000037634) The hearing examiner held that the Barnes doctrine 
prevailed, despite the intervening enactment of the more specific "ATV-DUI" statute, l.C. 67-
7114. The hearing examiner's holding is, of course, not binding upon the trial court but is 
certainly to be considered. 
This Court was all but prepared to rule for the Defendant, until closely re-examining the 
most fundamental premise of the defense, which is that Defendant's vehicle is not and was not a 
"motor vehicle" by statutory definition. I.C. §49-123(2) (g) reads as follows: 
"(g) Motor vehicle. Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of titling 
and registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in section 49-107, Idaho 
Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved solely by hwnan power, electric personal 
assistive mobility devices and motorized wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically 
exempt from titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code." 
The Court can certainly safely assume that the UTV in question is "self-propelled", and it 
also agrees that the UTV does not meet the FMSV safety standards. So, do the words, "for the 
purpose of titling and registration" operate to apply only to titling and registration requirements, 
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or do those words mean that a UTV cannot be considered to be a .. motor vehicle" for other 
purposes as well? 
The second sentence of the definition exempts bicycles, motorized wheelchairs, etc., 
"that are specifically exempt from titling or registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code" 
from being considered to be "motor vehicles". 
Unfortunately for the Defendant's position. UTVs are not exempt from registration 
requirements unless they are used "exclusively in connection with agricultural, horticultural, 
dairy and livestock growing and feeding operations or used exclusively for snow removal 
purposes ... " (LC.§ 49-426(2); also see LC.§ 67-7122) In fact, Defendant's UTV was duly 
registered with the Idaho Transportation Department. (Exhibit 2, affidavit of Ken Arment. 
September 15, 2011) 
Moreover, LC. §49-426(3) states, in part, that "The requirements of title 18 and chapters 
2,3,6,8,12, 12 and 14, title 49, Idaho Code, shall apply to the operation of any all-terrain vehicle, 
utility type vehicle or motorbike upon highways." This is about as specific as it gets, and in the 
Court's view, thoroughly resolves the issue. 
As the Defendant stated in her well-written Memorandum in Support of Motion to 
Dismiss, "Simply put, statutes which are in pari materia are to be construed together to further 
legislative intent", citing Barnes, supra. The Barnes court defined in pari maleria at length, as 
follows: 
"'The rule that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together means that each 
legislative act is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the same matter or subject. Statutes 
are in pari materia when they relate to the same subject. Such statutes are taken together and 
construed as one system, and the object is to carry into effect the intention. lt is to be inferred 
that a code of statutes relating to one subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was 
intended to be consistent and harmonious in its several parts and provisions. For the purpose of 
learning the intention, all statutes relating to the same subject are to be compared, and so far as 
still in force brought into harmony by interpretation." 
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Consistent with the in pari materia rule, and considering all the statutes referred to in this 
opinion, this Court can hard1y conclude that the legislature, despite its enactment of what one 
might call an "ATV/DUI" law, i.e. I.C. § 67-7114, that it somehow intended to exclude ATVs or 
UTVs or snowmobiles from compliance with requirements W'lder Title 18, Idaho Code. LC.§ 
67-7114 applies to lJTVs and other such vehicles whether on a public roadway or highway or 
off-highway. The statute could be utilized in circumstances where the vehicle's contact with a 
public roadway was minimal or in doubt, as well as in cases where the conduct with a vehicle 
took place entirely away from a public road. That would present a charging decision for the 
prosecutor, but not a prohibition against pursuing charges pursuant to Title 18. 
The State may proceed pursuant to its Amended Criminal Complaint. 
The Defendant's motion to dismiss is hereby DENIED. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
[ hereby certify that on this 27th day October, 201 J, I mailed (served) a true and correct 
copy of the within instrument to tbe following: 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
Matthew C. Williams 
US Mail Hand Delivered __ Facsimile...{___ Interdepartmental Mail 
Jeffrey Brownson 
j brownson@nbmlaw.com 
US Mail Hand Delivered 
ARCHIE N. BANBURY 
Clerk of the District Court 
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I SEP15211 MATTHEW C. WILLIAMS. ISB # 6271 
Valley County Prosecuting Attorney 
KENNETH R. ARMENT, ISB # 3394 
Valley County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
P.O. Box. \ 350 
,..ft ..... No Inst.No 
VCIM ---- ·2, ta P.M Flied. A.M~...-,..:aG-
Cascade, ID 8361 1 
Phone(208)382-7l20 
Facsimile (208) 382-7124 
JN THE DISTRICT COCRT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, lN AND FOR VALLEY COUNTY 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plain ti ft: 
vs. 
RHONDA L. TRUSOALL. 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~) 
STATE OF IDAHO 
County of Valley 
) SS. 
J 
CASE NO. CR-l l-1684-C 
AFFIOA VIT FOR ALS DECISION 
AND VEHICLE RESGISTRA TION 
AND TITLING INFORMATION 
l. Kenneth R. Arment, being first duly sworn, depose and say: 
I. I am employed as a Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for the Valley County Prosecuting 
Attorney ('"VCPA"); I have been assigned to the above-entitled cases; I am familiar with 'the 
VCPA files in the cases and the activities of the VCPA related thereto; and make this 
affidavit based upon my personal knowledge, belief and recollection; 
2. Attached as Exhibit 1, and incorporated herein by reference, is a photocopy of the 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order entered by the Administrative Hearing 
Examiner Skip Carter on or about July 21, 2011, regarding the incident giving rise to the 
Atlidavit of Kenneth R. Arment 9/16/2011, Pg. 
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above-entitled ca:,e. Affiant was emailed the decision from VCSD Corporal Tom Cimbalik 
in .pdf format and was printed out yesterday evening. lt appears that the same issues 
currently being raised in the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss were also raised in the 
Administrative License Suspension proceedings. The State believes the ALS ruling may be 
of some benefit to the Cou11. Affiant had not pre,1iously known of the decision; 
3. Attached as Exhibit 2, and incorporated herein by reference. is a photocopy of the results 
of Affiant's Motor Vehicle Record Request, made on or about August 2, 2011, with regard 
to the Defendant's Utility Type Vehicle she w<ts reported to be driving at the time of her 
stop. 1 made my request to and received the Exhibit 2 information from the Valley County 
vehicle licensing/records office, of the County Assessor. DA TED this !£th day of 
Septt:mbcr, 2011 
Kenneth R. Arment 
SUBSCRlBED AND SWORN TO before me this i $ day of September, 2 
Affidavit of Kenneth R. Arment, 9/16/2011, 
1 
J 
/ 
_____ , __ '----~--
Pg. 
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CERTlFlCA TE OF SERVICE 
I will cause a true and correct copy of the forgoing document to hand-delivered to the 
following at or before the 3:30 PM hearing set for this date. In the event counsel for Defendant 
does not appear at the scheduled hearing, I will make sure that alternative service of this 
Affidavit will be made as soon as practicable 011 this <late via fax and/or email. 
Jeffrey Brownson 
Nevin, Benjamin, McKay & Bartlett LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 
Boise. 10 83701 
DATED this 16th day of September, 201 l. 
-1L~ 
Kenneth R. Arment 
Affidavit of Kenneth R. Arment, 9i1612011. Pg. 
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IN THE IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT 
lN THE Yi.ATl'ER OF THE 
DRIVING PRIVILEGES OF: 
Rhonda Lee Trusdall 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
IDAHO D.L. YC35518J 
FILE NO. 212000037634 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
ORDER 
This matter came on for administrative license suspension hearing on July 18, 
20 l I by telephone conference. Jeffery Brownson, Attorney at Law, represented Trusdall. 
The suspension set out in the Notice of Suspension served pursuant to Idaho Code 
~18-8002A; is SUSTAlNED. 
EXHlBlT LISTii 
1. Notice of Suspension 
2. Evidentiary test results 
3. Sworn Statement 
4. Copy of Citation #37634 
5. Envelope from Law Enforct:ment Agency 
6. Certification of Receipt of Law Enforcement Documents 
7. Petitioner's Request for Hearing 
8. Petitioner·s Driver License Record 
9. Subpoena - Civil 
10. Subpoena- Duccs Tecum 
11. Subpoena - Duces Tecum 
12. Subpoena- Duces Tecum 
13. Subpoena - Civil 
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14. Subpoena - Civil 
Petitioner supplemented the record with the following exhibits: 
A. Proof of Service 
R. Proof of Service 
C. Proof of Service 
D. Proof of Service 
E. ISP Forensic Services LD. Card 
F. Instrument Operations Log 
G. Simulator Solution Log 
H. Instrument Certification 
l. Report 
J. CD 
K. Written Argument 
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCREDINGSiii 
Officer Tom Cimbalik testified and his testimony can be heard on the audio record 
of the proceeding. 
Exhibit K contains Mr. Brownson 's argument for the case. At the time of the 
hearing, Mr. Brownson also argued that a more specific statute addresses driving an ATV 
while under the int1uence and that statute does not provide the authority to suspend a 
person's driving privileges through the administrative license suspension proceeding. 
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FINDlNGS OF FACT 
f, having heard all issues raised. having considered the exhibits admitted as 
evidence; having considered the matter herein; and being advised in the premises and the 
law, make the following Findings of Fact: 
BlRDEN OF PROOF 
Pursuant to Idaho Code ~ 18-8002A(7) the Petitioner has the Burden of Proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence regarding all Jtlaho Code § l 8-8002A standards and all 
issues raised by the Petitioner. 
l. 
WAS THERE LEGAL CAUSE TO STOP THE VEHICLE DRIVEN BY THE 
PETITIONER? 
I. Officer Cimbalik stopped the UTY vehicle (more commonly refrrred to as an 
ATV. "All-Terrain Vehicle") driven by TrusdaJl on June 25. 2011 at 
approximately 2137 hours in Valley County, Idaho for reckless driving by 
spinning the vehicle in circles. throwing up dust and gravel as it spun in the 
Catholic Church parking lot. private property open to the public, in violalion of 
Idaho Code. §49-1401. 
2. Otficer Cimbalik had lega[ cause to stop the vehicle driven by Trusdall. 
l'INDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER··-3 
53 
2. 
WAS THERE LEGAL CAUSE TO BELIEVE TUE PETITIONER WAS lN 
VIOLATION OF IDAHO CODE §18-8004? 
1. The probable cause affidavit submitted by Officer Cimbalik states that Trusdall 
exhibited the following behaviors: 
a. Odor of Alcoholic Beverage 
b. Admitted to consuming alcohol 
c. Glassy eyes 
d. Bloodshot eyes 
e. Slu1Ted speech 
2. Trusdall met the minimum decision points on the following Standardized Field 
Sobriety tests: 
a. Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus 
b. Walk and Tum 
c. One Leg SLand 
3. Officer Cimbalik observed Trusdall in actual physical control of the vehicle. 
4. Idaho Code, §49-l 23(2)(a) contains the definition of motor vehicle. Idaho Code, 
§49- l 23(2)(g) sets forth the title requirements for self propelled motor vehicles. 
The ATV tr.at Trusdall was driving (or in actual physical control) meets both 
definitions. 
5. Trusdall argues that where there is a more specific statute. the state cannot charge 
a person under the less specific statute even \:vhere the facts fit the stati.:te, thus the 
more specific ATV statute. I. C. §67-7114. controls. 
6. 1. C. §67-7114 provides in part that any person driving or operating an all-terrain 
vehicle under the influence of alcohol on a public roadway or highway or off-
highway shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AJ\D CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER---4 
54 
7. ln following Lhe guidelines and reasoning of State of Idaho v. Barnes, 133 fdaho 
378 ( 1999), it is appropriate to apply the doctrine of in pari materia to the case at 
hand. The Court in Barnes held that driving a snowmobile on a public roadway 
while intoxicated was covered by both I. C. 18-8004 and I. C. §67-7110(2), that 
there \.Vas no conflict and that Barnes could have been prosecuted under either 
statute: ·· ... statutes which are in pari mareria are to be construed together to 
further legislative intent.'' Idaho Couns define in pari materia as follows: 'The 
rule that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together which means that 
each legislative act is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the same matter 
or subject. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same subject. Such 
statutes are taken together and construed as one system, and the object is to carry 
into effect the intention. It is to be inferred that a code of statutes relating to one 
subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was intended to be consistent 
and harmonious in its several parts and provisions. For the purpose of learning the 
intention. all statutes relating to the same subject are to be compared. and so far as 
still in force hrought into harmony by intcrprerntion." See Barnes, citing Grand 
CanyonDorfesv. Idaho State TaxComm'n.124ldaho l (1993). 
8. The court di<l add that ''where two statutes appear to apply to the same case or 
subject matter, the specific statute wi!I control over the more general statute.'' See 
also, V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho Transp Dep 't, 131 Idaho 482 ( 1998); and State v. 
Wilson, I 07 Idaho 506 ( 1984 ). 
9. In Barnes, the Court stated Lhat both statutes dealt with the subject of operating a 
motor vehicle while intox.icated, but both statutes were specific in different 
aspects: I. C. §67-71l0(2) was specific about the type of motor vehicle, while I. C. 
§ 18-8004 was specific about where the motor vehicle was being operated and 
what constitutes intoxication. fhe Comt stated that "despite the fact that these 
statutes can both be construed more specific than the other in certain aspects, they 
can both be construed harmoniously under the facts iflthe] case." Once Barnes 
elected to operate her snowmobile on a highway or public roadway while 
Fl:--.ID!NGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER---5 
55 
/ 
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intoxicated, her actions came under the purview of both I. C. §6 7-7110(2) and 
Idaho Code § l 8-8004, and that she could have been prosecuted under either 
slatute. See also State v. Vetsch, 101 Idaho 595, 596, P.2d 773, 774 (1980); and 
State v. Phillips, 117 Idaho 23, 27, 784 P.2d 353, (Ct. App. 1989). 
J 0. The Court in Barnes went on to note that the 1999 Idaho Legislature amended 
Chapter 7L Title 67 of the Idaho Code to provide that the operation of a 
snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle under the influence of alcohol, drugs or other 
imoxicatir.g substances on a public roadway or highway shall be a misdemeanor. 
1999 ldaho Sess. Laws Ch. 359 (House Bill 55, effective July 1, J 999). The Court 
rhcn stated that "when the legislature enacts an amendment to an existing statute, it 
has done so to clarify, strengthen or make a change to an existing statute. 
11. In this matter, it is cleanhat both L C. § 18-8004 and I. C. §67-7114 deal wilh the 
subject of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. 
12. It is also clear that both statutes are specific in different aspects; l. C. §67-7114 is 
specific with the respect to the type of motor vehicle being operated by the 
intoxicaced person, i.e. an ATV, while L C. § 18-8004 is specific about where the 
motor vehicle is being operated and what consti~utes intoxication. 
13. Trusdall was operating a motor vehicle. an !\TV. on private property open to the 
public, while intoxicated. and thus, made herself subject to both Idaho Code§ 18-
8004 and LC. §67~7114. 
14. According to the Idaho Supreme Court, when the 1999 ldaho Legislature amended 
Chapter 71. Title 6 7 of the Idaho Code to provide that the operation of a 
snowmobile or all-terrain vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or 
other intoxicating substances on a public roadway or highway to be a 
misdemeanor, the legislature only intended to simply clarify and strengthen that 
chapter so that there would be no mistake that the operation of a snowmobile, or 
all-terrain vehicle, a public roadway or highway while intoxicated would result in 
the same legal consequence as the operation of any other motor vehicle while 
intoxicated. 
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5. 
DID THE EVIDENTIARY TESTING INSTRUMENT FUNCTION PROPERLY 
WHEN THE TEST WAS ADMINISTERED? 
1. The evidentiary testing instrument used to test 'frusdall completed a valid 
performance verification check with a simulator solution at 21 :42 hours on June 
25, 201 l. 
2. The valid performance verification approved the instrument for evidentiary testing 
in accordance with ISP Standard Operating Procedure. 
3. The Petitioner. Trusdall, did not affirmatively show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the testing instrument was not functioning properly at the time of 
testing. 
4. The evidcntiary testing instrument functioned properly when the test was 
administered. 
6. 
WAS THE PETITIONER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBLE SUSPENSION OF HER 
IDAHO DRIVING PRIVILEGES? 
I. Trusdall was played the audio version of the Idaho Code § l 8-8002A advisory 
form prior to submitting to evidentiary testing. 
2. Trusdall was advi:;ed of the consequences of refusing or failing evidentiary testing 
as required by Idaho Code ~ 18-8002 and Idaho Code § l 8-8002A. 
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15. Therefore. based on the l <laho Supreme Court's use of the doctrine of in pari 
materia, it can be properly concluded that Trusdall is subject to a license 
suspension since she operated a motor vehicle on private property open to the 
public, and that this action is covered by both I. C. §18-8004 and I. C. §67-7114 
and that there is no conflict between the two statutes. 
16. Trusdall's argument fails. 
17. Officer Cimbalik had sufficient legal cause to arrest Trusdall and request an 
evidentiary test. 
3. 
DID THE EVIDENTIARV TEST RESULTS INDICATE A VIOLATION OF §18-
8004? 
l. The analyses of the breath samples obtained from Trusdall indicated a BrACiv of 
.1691.164. 
2. Trusdall is in violation of Idaho Code § 18-8004. 
4. 
WAS THE EVIDENTIARY TEST PERFORMED IN COMPLIANCE WITH ALL 
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN IDAHO LAW AND ISP STANDARD 
OPERA TING PROCEDURE? 
I. The affidavit submitted by Officer Cimbalik states the evidentiary test was 
performed in compliance with Idaho Law and ISP Standard Operating Procedures. 
2. The Petitioner, Trusdall. did not affirmatively show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the test was not performed in compiiance with Idaho Law and ISP 
Standard Operaring Procedures. 
3. The evidentiary test was performed in compliance with 1daho Law and ISP 
Standard Operating Procedures. 
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CONCLUSION OF LAW 
CONFLICTING FACTS, IF ANY, WERE COKSIDERED AND REJECTED IN 
FAVOR OF THE FOREGOING ClTED FACTS. BASED UPON THE FOREGOING 
FINDINGS OF FACT I CONCLUDE THAT ALL OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 
SUSPENSION OF THE PETITIONER'S DRIVING PRIVILEGES SET FORTH IN 
IDAHO CODE §§18-8002 AND 18-8002A WERE COMPLIED WITH IN THIS CASE. 
THE FOLLOWING ORDER JS RENDERED: 
ORDER 
The suspension set forth in the Notice of Suspension. served pursuant to I.C. § l 8-
8002A, is SUSTAINED AND SHALL RUN FOR A PERIOD OF 90 DAYS 
COMMENCING ON JULY 25, 2011 AND SHALL REMAIN IN EFFECT 
THROUGH OCTOBER 23, 2011. 
DATED this 21st day of July. 20l l. 
SKlP CARTER 
ADMll\ISTRATIVE HEARING EXAMll'-iER 
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FINAL ORDER 
(Hearings pursuant to rdaho code § l 8-8002A) 
This is a final order of the Department. 
A motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Idaho Transportation Department's 
Administrative License Suspension Hearing Unit, P.O. Box 7129, Boise, Idaho 83707-
1129 within fourteen ( 14) days of the service date of this order. If the hearing Officer 
fails to act upon this motion within twenty-one (21) days of its receipt. the motion will be 
deemed denied, according to the Idaho Code §67-5243(3). 
Or, pursuant to sections 67-5270 and 67-5272, Idaho Code, any party aggrieved by this 
final order or orders previously issued in this case may appeal this final order and all 
previously issued orders in this case to District Court by filing a petitioner for judicial 
review in the District Court of the county "vhich: 
I . A hearing was held; 
2. The final agency action was taken~ or 
3. The party seeking review of the order resides. 
An appeal must be filed within twenty-eight (28) days of the service date of this final 
order. The filing of an appeal to District Court does not itself stay the effectiveness or 
enforcement of the order under appeal. 
ENDNOTES 
'Idaho's Implied Consent Statute 
' ITD Exhibits <1re numeric, Petitioner's exhibits are by letter 
'"Argument and testimony is summarized from record of tf)e hearing 
''Breath Alcohol Concentration 
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VCPA 
KEN ARMENT 
PO BOX 1350 
CASCADE 
IDAHO TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT 
Vehicle services, Plates • P.O. Box 7129 
Boise ID 83707·1129 
ID 83611 
RE: Motor Vehicle Record Request 
(208) 334·8649 
dnw. idaho.gov 
08/02/2011 
This is the motor vehicle record you requested. If you need further information please 
contact the Idaho Transportation Department.Motor Vehicle Records Desk at (208) 334-8773. 
Our Fax number is (208) 332-4189. 
1. OWNER INFORMATION: 
TRUSDALL. RHONDA LEE 
11694 W GIANTS DR 
30ISE 
2. REGISTRATION INFORMATION: 
License Plate: i:.:R7349 
Reg type: RU Sub type: RES 
Sticker Number: L"R7349 
l VEHICLE INFORMATION: 
ID 
---- ND ?EES -
83709 
Expiration Date: 12 /31/2015 
Options: 
Tran type: co Tran date: 06/23/2011 
VIN: 4XARD68Al6D747319 Title Number: A099004408 
Year: 2006 Make: POLS 
Weight: 
Model: :JTV Body: ".JV Description: RANGER 
Color: G&'\J' Length: 
System Ident. Number: Q3H0217 56 Operatorlnitials: KR 
Section 49·-203 Idaho Code prohibits the release of personal information contained in 
driver and vehicle records to unauthorized parties, without express written consent of the 
individual the information pertains to. As an authorized requester you may receive this 
information but you may nol re-lease or re-sell it. 
FEES PAID: 
INQUIRY $. 00 
TOTAL $ .00 
Jeffrey Brownson 
•UyQ': 
' ' ' '' '/t ~ ·J~· ,, " 
,.u v '".' 
H'.~ n 2 ,·.~J 
' : { ·~ 
NEVfN, BEl\JAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
P.O. Box 2772 ' ... : ; ........ --~--· '":,-<·-. !·i.-' .. -·~---......... .__. 
303 West Bannock 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
(208) 343- l 000 
: .. "···-~ - ····-·· '•::: ~ . ..;...{J ___ J'.'~.l 
Attorneys for the Def end ant 
IN THE DISTR!CT COURT FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DlSTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IK AKD FOR Tl IE COUNTY OF V Al.LEY 
STA TE OF IDAHO. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RHONDA TRUSDALL, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
---------- ------- ) 
Case No. CR-20 l l-1684-C 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
The Defendant Rhonda TrusdalL through her attorneys, files this Memorandum in 
Support of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
A. Procedural History and Statement of Facts 
On June 25. 201 I, at approximately 9:30 p.m. Rhonda Trusdall was spinning circles in 
a utility-terrain vehicle (2006 Polaris Ranger) in the Catholic Church parking lot just north of 
Cascade, ldaho. 1 Along with Ms. Trusdall in the utility-terrain vehicle were six children. Ms. 
Trusdall was approached by Valley County Sheriff Officer Tom Cimbalik who was driving 
southbound on Highway 55. Following the administration of field sobriety tests Ms. Trusdall 
1 The facts set forth in this memorandum are taken from the police reports and audio 
recordings provided to the defense in discovery. 
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was ptaced in handcuffs and arrested for driving under the influence. Ms. Trusdall then 
submitted to a breath test and was eventually cited with driving under the influence in violation 
of Idaho Code§§ 18-8004(1)(a) & 18-8005(1). Ms. Trusdall was also cited for injury to a child 
in violation of Idaho Code§ 18-1501(3)_ failure to a carry driver's license, in violation of Idaho 
Code § 49-316, and transportation of an alcoholic beverage, in violation of Idaho Code § 23-
505. 
B. Argument 
1) Standard of Review 
The standard of review for interpretation of a statute was recently summarized by the 
Idaho Supreme Court as follows: 
The object of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. The 
literal words of the statute provide the best guide to legislative intent, and 
therefore. the interpretation of a statute must begin with the literal words of the 
statute. The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed 
legislative intent is contrary or unless the plain meaning leads to absurd results. 
This Court gives the words of a statute their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning. 
Moreover, this Court must consider all sections of applicable statutes together to 
determine the intent of the legislature. 
Jf the language of a statute is capable of more than one reasonable construction 
it is ambiguous. When a statute is ambiguous, it must be construed to mean 
what the legislature intended it to mean. To dctcnnine that intent, we examine 
not only the literal words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed 
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its legislative history. 
State v. Doe, 14 7 ldaho 326, 327-28, 208 P.3d 730, 731-32 (2009) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). Furthennore: 
[Lis incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpn.:lation which will not 
render it a nulllty. Where ambiguity exists as to the elements of a crime, this 
Cow1 will srrjctly construe the criminal statute in favor of the defendant. 
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State v. Beard, 135 Idaho 64L 646, 22 P.3d 116, 121 (Ct. App. 2001) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted) (emphasis added); accord State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 274, 92 P .3d 52 l, 
524 (2004) ("where the ambiguity exists as Lo the elements of or potential sanctions for a crime, 
this Court will strictly construe the statute in favor of the defendant"). 
2) A Utilit):-Terrain Vehicle Is :Not a "Motor V chicle" As a Matter of Law 
Ms. Trusdall cannot be charged with driving under the influence under Idaho Code§ 
18-8004(1 )(a) because a utility-terrain vehicle designed for off road use is not a "motor 
vehicle" under Idaho law. 
The general driving under the influence statute in Idaho provides: 
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any 
other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any 
other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08, as 
defined in subsection (4) of this section, or more, as shown by analysis ofhis 
blood, urine, or breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle within this state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon 
public or private property open to the public. 
I.C. § 18-8004(a)(l) (emphasis added). 
Idaho Code section 49- J 23(2)(g) defines "motor vehicle" as follows: 
Every vehicle which is self-propelled, and for the purpose of titling and 
registration meets federal motor vehicle safety standards as defined in section 
49- I 07, Idaho Code. Motor vehicle does not include vehicles moved solely by 
human power, electric personal assistive mobility devices and motorized 
wheelchairs or other such vehicles that are specifically exempt from titling or 
registration requirements under title 49, Idaho Code. 
I.C. § 49-l 23(2)(g} (emphasis added). 
And the "federal motor vehicle safety standards" (FMVSS) are defined in section 49-
107 as: 
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[T]hosc safety standards established by the national highwav traffic safety 
administration, under title 49 CFR p.art 500.-599, for the safe construc1ion and 
manufacturing of self-propelled motorized vehicles for operation on public 
high\'1ays. Such vehicles as originally designed and manufactured shaJl be so 
certified by the manufacturer to meet the federal motor vehicle safety standards 
or the standards in force for a given model year or as certified by the national 
highway traffic safety administration. 
l.C. § 49-107(5) (emphasis added). Therefore, in order to be treated as a "motor vehicle" under 
Idaho Code § 18-8004 the national highway traffic safety administration must have 
promulgated safety regulations under title 49 CFR part 500-599 for the utility-terrain vehicle 
operated by :-.1s. Trusdall. 
However, and most importantly, neither the federal motor vehicle safety standards nor 
Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR), Parts 500-599 apply to utility-terrain 
vehicles designed for off road use such as the one operated by Ms. Trusdall. Parts 500-599 of 
the CFR are absent any safety regulations regarding utility-terrain vehicles. As explained by 
the national highway traffic safety admfoistration itself, "[ v ]ehicles such as race cars, dirt 
bikes, and all-terrain vehicles that are not primarily manufactured for on-road use do not 
qualify as motor vehicles and are therefore not regulated by NHTSA." National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration, "Requirements for Manufacturers of Motor Vehicles and Motor 
Vehicle Equipment," p.7 (November 16, 2010)2 (emphasis added). 
Ms. Trusdall simply was not operating a ''motor vehicle" by law and this Court must 
therefore dismiss the charge of driving under the influence in violation of Idaho Code § 18-
8004( l )(a) for lack of jurisdiction. 
2 r\ vailable at http://w\\w.nhtsa.gov/cars/rules/maninfo/newManf pdf (last visited July 19. 
2011 ). 
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3) The Intentiop of Idaho Code Section 18-8004(1)(a) Was Not to Prosecute 
the Act of Operating an Utilit)'-Terrain or All-Terrain Type Vehicle 
fn addition to not operating a "motor vehjc)e" as a matter of law. Ms. Trusdall is also 
improperly charged under Idaho Code § 18-8004. Upon the facts of this case, charging Ms. 
Trusdal I under the general driving under the influence statute impermissibly renders Idaho 
Code§ 67-7114 a nullity. Section 67-7114 reads: 
Operation under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or any other intoxicating 
substance. Any person driving or operating a snowmobile, motorbike, utility 
type vehicle, specialty off-highway vehicle or all-terrain vehicle under the 
influence of alcohol. drugs or any other intoxicating substance on a public 
roadway or highway or off-highway shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. 
LC.§ 67-7114. 
It is anticipated the State will argue that under the doctrine of in pari materia and the 
holding in Slate v. Barnes, I 3 3 Idaho 378, 987 P.2d 290 ( 1999) the prosecuting attorney has the 
discretion to charge Ms. Trusdall under either Idaho Code§ 18-8004 or Idaho Code§ 67-7l l4. 
Should the State attempt to make this argument. it is misplaced and should be rejected because 
Barnes is distinguishable and not controlling here. 
In Barnes, the defendant argued he could not be charged under the general driving 
under the influence statute since he was operating a snowmobile while under the influence. 
The Court, limiting its decision to the circumstances in that case, held that under the doctrine of 
in pari maleria the infraction of operating a snowmobile under the influence is not in conflict 
with Idaho Code § I 8-8004 and therefore the prosecutor "had the discretion to prosecute 
Barnes under either statute." ld. at 294, 987 P.2d at 3 82. 
In reaching this conclusion the Barnes Court defined in pari materia as follows: 
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The rule that statutes in pari materia are to be construed together means that 
each legislative acr is to be interpreted with other acts relating to the same 
matter or subject. Statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same 
subject. Such stalutes are taken together and construed as one system, and the 
object is to carry into effect the intention. It is to be inferred that a code of 
statutes relating to one subject was governed by one spirit and policy, and was 
intended to be consistent and harmonious in its several parts and provisions. 
For the purpose of learning the intention, all statutes relating to the same subject 
are to be compared, and so far as still in force brought into hannony by 
interpretation. 
Id., citing Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho Stale fox Comm'n, 124 Idaho I, 4, 855 P.2d 462, 465 
( 1993 ). Simply put, statutes which are in pari materia are to be construed together to forth er 
legislative intent. State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 382, 987 P.2d 290, 294 (l 999). 
However, when two statutes appear ta apply to the same case or subject matter, the 
more specific statute will control over the more general statute. Id., citing V-1 Oil Co. v. Idaho 
Transp. Dep't, 131 Idaho 482, 483, 959 P.2d 463, 464 ( 1998). Similarly, when two statutes 
cannot be construed "harmoniously,'' "the more specific of the two statutes will prevail." State 
v. Cailaghan, 143 Idaho 856, 858-60, 153 P.Jd 1202, 1203-05 (Ct. App. 2006); see also, 
United States v. Estale of Romani, 523 U.S. 517, 532 (1998) (later, more specific statute 
governs). 
Here, Idaho Code § 67-7114 and Idaho Code § 18-8004 may relate to similar subject 
matter but they cannot be viewed as truly harmonious. Idaho Code § 6 7-7114 specifically 
addresses conduct involving recreational vehicles, i.e. utility-terrain vehicles, whereas, Idaho 
Code § 18-8004 applies to any "motor vehic!c.''3 It is obvious the Idaho Legislature intended 
the conduct at issue in the present case to be governed hy Section 67-7114. This Court must 
3 As discussed above, an utility-terrain vehicle is not a "motor vehicle" under Idaho Code 
§ 18-8004. 
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presume the lt:gislature means what it says in a statute otherwise the incorporation of public 
roadways or highways in Section 67-7114 is meaningless and renders the statute a nullity. 
\foreover, unlike the former version of[daho Code§ 67-7110 which the defendant in 
Barnes argued was applicable to him, ldaho Code§ 67· 7114 specifically and unequivocally 
applies to Ms. Trusdall. The former version ofldaho Code § 67-7110 was an unusually broad 
statute regarding the general rules governing the operation of a snowmobile. To the contrary, 
Idaho Code§ 67-7114 deals precisely with operating a recreational vehicle under the influence 
of alcohol. Moreover. the defendant in Barnes was attempting to escape criminal liability 
because Section 67-7110 was merely an infraction. Ms. Trusdall acknowledges Idaho Code§ 
6 7-7114 is a misdemeanor crime and is not attempting to preclude prosecution of such crime. 
Additionally. the Court of Appeals has recently reiteratt::d that when two statutes 
arguably apply the most specific and more recently enacted statute wiJl govern over an older 
and more general staiute. See Stale v. Callaghan, J 43 Idaho 856, 859, 153 P.3d 1202, 1205 
(Ct. App. 2006). In Callaghan, the Court of Appeals held that although there are two statutory 
schemes dealing with the subject matter at issue, the legislative intent was clear that "forgery of 
a certificate of insurance would be punished as a misdemeanor. not as a felony .... " Id. In 
reaching this conclusion the Court of Appeals relied upon the canon of statutory construction 
that "[ w Jhere a harmonious construction is impossible, the more specific of the t\VO statutes 
will prevail." Id. at 858-859, 153 P.3d at 1204-05. 
The same is true in this case. Because Idaho Code§ 67-7114 specifically deals with the 
subject matter of Ms. Trusdall's case this Court must dismiss the charge of driving under the 
influence in violation of Idaho Code § I 8-8004( I )(a) for lack of jurisdiction. 
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4) The Rule of Lenity Also Compels Dismissal 
The Rule of Lenity states that criminal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the 
defendant. State v. Harnes. 124 ldaho 379, 380. 859 P.2d 1387, 1399 {l 993) (affinning trial 
court's dismissal of theft charge based upon application of the Rule of Lenity to statute of 
limitation), overrult:d on other ground5 in Stale v. iilaidwell, J 37 Idaho 424, 50 P.Jd 439 
(2002). In other words, to the extent Idaho Code§ 67-71 )4 is ambiguous or if there is some 
doubt as to whether ldaho Code§ 67-7114 and fdaho Code§ 18-8004 can be construed 
together, the Rule of Lenity compels the Court to construe the statutes and their application in 
Ms. Trusdall's favor. Brown v. Slate, 137 Idaho 529, 536-37, 50 P.3d 1024, 1031-32 (Ct. App. 
2002). There can be no room for prosecutorial discretion in this case. 
Similarly, though a utility-terrain vehicle by law is not a "motor vehicle," should there 
be any question or ambiguity the Court must construe the statutes and regulations in Ms. 
Trusdall's favor pursuant to the Rule of Lenity. 
5) The Other Chari:es Ar:ainst Ms. TrusdaJI Must Also Be Dismissed fGr Lack 
of Jurisdiction 
As explained above, Ms. Trw:;dall was not operating a "motor vehicle" as a matter of 
law on June 25, 2011. Since the utility-terrain vehicle she was operating is not a "motor 
vehicle'' the other charges against her must also be dismissed. 
Yfs. Trusdall is charged with injury to a child under Idaho Code§ 18-1501(3) which 
reads in relevant part: 
A person over the age of eighteen ( 18) years commits the crime of injury to a 
child if the person transports a minor in a motor vehicle or vessel ddined in 
section 67-7003, Idaho Code, while under the influence of alcohol. intoxicating 
liquor, a controlled substance, or any combination thereoJ: in Yiolation of 
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section 18-8004 or 67-7034, Idaho Code. 
LC.§ 18-1501 (3) (emphasis added). Since Ms. Trusdall was not operating a "motor vehicle" 
nor was .she in violation of section J 8-8004, she cannot be charged with injury to a child in 
violation of l<laho Code § 18-l SO 1 (3). 
Ms. Trusdall is also charged with transporting an alcoholic beverage in violation of 
Idaho Code § 23-505(2): 
No person in a motor vchiili, while the vehicle is on a public highway or the 
right-of-way of a public highway may drink or possess any open beverage 
containing alcoholic liquor, as defined in section 23-105, Idaho Code. beer as 
defined in section 23-100 I, Idaho Code, or wine as defined in section 23-1303, 
Idaho Code. unless such person is a passenger in the passenger area of a motor 
vehicle designed, maintained, or used primarily for the transportation of persons 
for compensation. or in the living quarters of a recreational vehicle as that tenn 
is defined in section 49-119, Idaho Code. Violation of this section is a 
misdemeanor for the individual in actual physical control of the vehicle, as 
defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code, and an infraction for other individuals 
violating this section. 
I.C. § 23-505(2) (emphasis added). Since Ms. Trusdall was not operating a "motor vehic:le" 
she cannot be charged with transporting an alcoholic beverage in violation of Idaho Code § 23-
505(2). 
Finally. Ms. Trusdall is charged with failure to carry a driver's license in violation of 
Idaho Code § 49-316, which reads in relevant part: 
Every licensee shall have his driver's license in his immediate possession at alJ 
times when operating a mocor vehicle and shalt upon demand, surrender the 
driver's license into the hands of a peace officer for his inspection. 
LC. § 49-316 (emphasis added). Because Ms. Trusdall was not operating a "motor vehicle" she 
cannot be charged with failure to carry a driver· s license in violation of Idaho Code§ 49-3 J 6. 
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C. Co11clusio11 
For the reasons set forth above. the Court should dismiss the charges in this case. 
Dated this~ day of August, 2011. 
NEVIN, OENJAMN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP 
UJ,,, IJ-----------
Jeffre1l!!son 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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